The Right Of Public Employees To Strike by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 18 | Issue 2 Article 14
Fall 9-1-1961
The Right Of Public Employees To Strike
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
The Right Of Public Employees To Strike, 18 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 297 (1961),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol18/iss2/14
1961] CASE COMMENTS 297
lack of jurisdiction factually, the defendant who litigated the case
would have availed himself of that defense.
The result under the present concept of res judicata seems to be
that, absent a clear lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, there
must be some special reason for withholding the jurisdiction or else
the judgment or decree will stand up on collateral attack. If the judg-
ment or decree is entered because of the default of a party who had
notice and an opportunity to be heard, and under circumstances fav-
oring its finality, it too should be immune to collateral attack. To the
extent that public policy would favor its application, res judicata
affords a convenient rationale for a desirable result.
34
MACON C. PUTNLY
THE RIGHT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES TO STRIKE
"'Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives or their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection.""
This quoted language has been uniformly interpreted to give pri-
vate employees the right to strike peacefully to enforce their demands
with respect to wages, hours and other conditions of employment.
2
Whether these words give the employees of a public corporation the
right to strike was presented recently in Los Angeles Metropolitan
Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen.3
"'While the doctrine of res judicata has frequently been enmeshed in tech-
nicalities which it is difficult for us fully to understand today; and, while even
modern rules are often confusing and illogical; there runs through the huge mass of
judicial utterances on this subject a conspicuous desire to obtain a fair, reasonable
and just result." Medina, Conclusiveness of Rulings on Jurisdiction, 31 Col. L. Rev.
238, 243 (1931)-
'Cal. Gen. Laws Ann. act 4.18o, § 3.6(c) (Deering 1954) (pertains to the Los
Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957 as amended in 1959); 54 Cal.
2d 684, 355 P.2d 905, 907 (196o).
"Note 3 infra at 9o7. Accord, Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468,
47-1-75 (t9,5); Amalgamated Ass'n of State Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Re-
lations Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 389 (1951); International Union of United Auto. Workers
v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 457 (1950); Collins Baking Co. v. NLRB, 193 F.-d 483,
486 (2d Cir. 1942).
It must be emphasized that the right to strike peacefully and engage in other
concerted activities does not include illegal strikes or labor violence. See note 3
infra at 907, and International Union of United Auto. Workers v. O'Brien, 334 U.S.
454 (i95o); and International Union of United Auto. Workers v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 258 (1949).
354 Cal. 2d 684, 355 P.2d 905 (ig6o).
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The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant brotherhood
for a declaratory judgment that employees of the Los Angeles Metro-
politan Transit Authority were without the legal right to strike be-
cause they were employees of a public corporation. The trial court
held for the plaintiff, but the Supreme Court of California reversed.
Although the defendant union members are employed by a public
corporation, the Transit Authority Act 4 establishing the corporation
provides that employees should have the right to organize and to en-
gage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection,'and so by implication gives
employees the right to strike.
5
The majority decision points out that the sixteen italicized words
of the Transit Authority Act quoted above had been repeatedly used
in earlier labor statutes, both Federal 6 and state,7 and without legisla-
tive qualification had been held to give employees the right to strike to
enforce labor unions' demands. When courts construe legislation it
will be presumed that the legislature intended the language of the later
statute to be given the same interpretation as previously given. This
is usually the case when a state statute is modeled after a federal
statute.8 The court went on to say that since the same language as
contained in the California statute has been interpreted to give private
employees the right to strike, the repetition without any legislative
qualification manifestly shows an intent to follow in regard to public
employees the previous construction applied to private employees.9
4See note 1 supra.
rSee note 3 supra at 915.
6The language first appeared in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932),
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1958). The exact language was repeated in the National Labor
Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 7, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § tot (1958); and
the Labor Management Relations Act (Tart-Hartley Act) § 7, 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
7Cal. Labor Code § 923. "Negotiations of terms and conditions of labor should
result from voluntary agreement between employer and employees. Governmental
authority has permitted and encouraged employers to organize in the corporate
and other forms of capital control. In dealing with such employers, the individual
unorganized worker is helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to pro-
tect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions
of employment. Therefore it is necessary that the individual workman have full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his
own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that
he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor,
or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection."
sLos Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen,
54 Cal. 2d 684, 355 P.2d 905, 907 (1960).
9Ibid.
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Prior to plaintiff's acquisition of the transit company, the employees
had the right to strike. The Transit Authority Act in granting the
authority to operate transit facilities also provided that no employee
'shall suffer any worsening of his wages, seniority, pension, vacation
or other benefits by reason of the acquisition.' "10 The majority of the
court held that since the employees had the right to strike while they
were private employees, their rights cannot be denied or diminished by
subsequent acquisition of the company by the public.
The majority cites recent cases from two other jurisdictions sus-
taining the right of public employees to strike. In Local 266, Int'l Bhd.
of Elec. Workers v. Salt River Project Agr. Improvement & Power
Dist."1 the Supreme Court of Arizona held that an irrigation district
was a political subdivision of the state and its employees were entitled
to all rights, privileges, benefits and immunities of municipal em-
ployees and were therefore allowed to strike to enforce demands, which
the irrigation district was empowered to grant.12 The Minnesota case
of Board of Education v. Public School Employees' Union1" concerned
the interpretation of the state's statute that prohibited the issuance
of injunctions against strikes. School janitors were held not to be
"public officials charged with duties relating to public safety"' 4 and
thus could not be enjoined from striking. The court in the principal
case emphasized that these two decisions sustained its position be-
cause in both cases the employees were not specifically authorized to
bargain collectively and engage in other concerted activities as au-
thorized by the Transit Authority Act. 5
The case of United States v. United Mine Workers16 was distin-
guished as not being helpful in determining the proper construction of
the sixteen italicized words of the Transit Authority Act. In that case
it was held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not apply to United
States governmental employees. The court followed the rule of con-
struction that "statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing
rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without ex-
press words to that effect."' 7 The court in the principal case said that
the Transit Authority Act deals only with the employees of a public
"Ibid.
1178 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (950.
*Id. at 396.
"233 Minn. 144, 45 NAV.2d 797 (95).
"Id. at 8oi.
15355 P.2d at 9oB.
"133o U.S. 258 (947)-
'Id. at 272.
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corporation and not employees generally.' 8 The rule of construction
"that statutes in derogation of sovereignty are to be strictly construed
in favor of the state"'19 would not be applied in the light of the express
provisions of the Transit Authority Act providing for liberal construc-
tion to carry out the purposes of the act.
20
The court found that the purpose of the legislature was to create
an employment relationship comparable to that existing between pri-
vately-owned public utilities and their employees, because otherwise
the inability of th'e Transit Authority employees to strike would place
them in a disadvantageous position as compared with similar private
employees in regard to collective bargaining.21 The court thought
the legislature had intended to depart from traditional methods of es-
tablishing wages and conditions of emplpyment of government em-
ployees in favor of a system comparable to that utilized in private
industry.22 This was done by establishing an equal bargaining position
by permitting employees the right to strike and engage in other con-
certed activities as an essential part of the bargaining process, 23 and to
deprive the employees of their right to strike would have the effect
of nullifying their collective bargaining efforts by taking away their
most powerful weapon.
The dissent written by Justice Schauer in the principal case points
out that the decision of the majority is contrary to established law
and public policy:
"This is the only case in the judicial history of this state or
the United States... in which a court of last resort holds that a
statute which does not unequivocally and by clear language
grant to public employees a right to strike against the govern-
ment as an employer, nevertheless confers such right by impli-
cation."24
The holding that the general words of the Transit Authority Act
impliedly gave the employees a right to strike against their public
employer was challenged by the dissenters. They believe that such
a right to strike should not exist unless it is expressly granted, argu-
ing that such rights should have been "specifically granted in unmis-
2355 P.2d at gog.
" Ibid.
,Ibid. "The act expressly declares that it 'shall be liberally construed to




2 Id. at gi
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takable terms."2  Conceding that those same statutory words have
been interpreted by the courts to authorize the right to strike by pri-
vate employees, it does not necessarily follow that these same words by
implication authorize strikes by public employees.
26
While the majority summarily handled the Mine, Workers case,
the dissenters considered it authoritative. The United States Supreme
Court said in that case: "We think that Congress' failure to refer to the
United States or to specify any role which it might commonly be
thought to fill is strong indication that it did not intend that the act
should apply to situations in which the United States appears as
employer."27 The Court also said, "There is an old and well-known
rule that statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or
privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words
to that effect."'2s This is a rule of construction, but it has been applied
in situations similar to the one before the California court.29 The
dissent in the California case noted that Congress later codified the
decision in the Mine Workers case by including section 305 of Title
III in the Taft-Hartley Act,30 which made it unlawful for govern-
ment employees to participate in strikes. The penalty for such a strike
was immediate discharge, a three year ineligibility for government em-
ployment and loss of civil service status.3' These sanctions were re-
-Ibid.
21Id at 912.
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 276 (1947). The con-
curring opinion by Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas stated that, "Congress
had never in its history provided a program for fixing wages, hours, and working
conditions of its employees by collective bargaining. Working conditions of Govern-
ment employees had not been the subject of collective bargaining, nor been settled
as a result of labor disputes. It would require specific congressional language to
persuade us that Congress intended to embark upon such a novel program as to
treat the Government employer-employee relationship as giving rise to a 'labor
dispute' in the industrial sense." Id. at 328, 329. The Labor-Management Relations
Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 2, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1958), excludes the
United States "or any state or political subdivision thereof" from the term "em-
ployer."
2Id. at 272.
1'If such prohibition is intended to reach the government in the use of known
rights and remedies, the language must be clear and specific to that effect." United
States v. Stevenson, 215 US. 190, 197 (1909).
*'61 Stat. 136, c. 120 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 305 (1952). "It shall he unlawful for any
individual employed by the United States or any agency thereof including wholly
owned Government corporations, to participate in any strike."
n"Any individual employed by the United States or by any agency who strikes
shall be discharged immediately from his employment, and shall forfeit his civil
service status, if any, and shall not be eligible for reemployment for three years by
the United States or any such agency." Id. at § 305.
i96i]
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affirmed in 1955 and another one was added making such strikers
guilty of a felony and subject to fine and imprisonment
3 2
It is submitted that the holding of the majority is open to criticism
on a number of grounds. Few cases involving strikes by public em-
ployees have reached the courts and fewer have been reported, "how-
ever in every case that has been reported, the right of public employees
to strike is emphatically denied."3 3 Generally, public employees do
not have the right to strike in the absence of explicit legislative au-
thority.
34
Two recent decisions from Arizona and Minnesota relied upon by
the majority are readily distinguishable. The Salt River case from
Arizona, although holding that the employees of the irrigation district
had the right to strike, pointed out that the employees were classified
as "public employees," but in reality the district was owned by private
landholders and not the public. 5 The court concluded that a strike
would not be against the state because the employees were serving the
private owners of the district and not the general needs of the com-
munity.3 6
The Public School Employees case from Minnesota involved a
state statute prohibiting the use of injunctions in labor disputes except
when used against "policemen, firemen or any other, public officials
charged with duties relating to public safety."37 Following a rule of
interpretation "that where a statute designates an exception, proviso,
saving clause, or a negative, the exclusion of one thing includes all
others,"38 it is clear that school janitors are not public officials charged
with public safety duties.
There were many earlier cases from California apparently holding
differently from the principal case which were not overruled or clearly
3269 Stat. 624-625, c. 690 (1955), 5 U.S.C. § 118 (1958). "Any person who vio-
lates . . . this title shall be guilty of a felony, and shall be fined . . . or impris-
oned or both."
mAnnot., Vs A.L.R.2d 1142, 1159 (1953).
MId. at 1159-61; see also Rhyne, Municipal Law § 163 (1957).
3"Local 266, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Salt River Project Agr. Improvement
& Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393, 402 (1954). "To say hat the employees of
the District herein are actually 'public employees' is not the province of this
court but~a matter for the legislature." Id. at 401.
3Id. at 403. "We find no indication from either the cases or statutes which
indicate that the employees of this District may not engage in a peaceful strike.
This is not to imply that such social friction is desirable, only that the District, as
a business entity, is subject to the hazards of the economy as are its possible compe-
titors."
'Board of Educ. v. Public School Employees' Union, 233 Minn. 144, 45
N.V.2d 797, 8o (195).
3Ibid.
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distinguished. 39 Nutter v. City of Santa Monica40 previously held that
section 923 of the California Labor Code 4' was inapplicable to labor
relations of the state or its political subdivisions on the ground that
a statute in general terms will not be construed to include govern-
ment employees unless that interpretation is clear and indisputable
from the wording of the act.42 Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs43 had
granted an injunction preventing policemen from joining a union,
stating that all public officials owe their allegiance to the people,
and any alienation of this allegiance would be detrimental to the
function of government. 44 In State v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen45
the court stated that:
"Recent authorities hold uniformly that the wages, hours and
working conditions of government employees must be fixed by
statute or ordinance and that state laws which, in general
terms, secure the right of employees to enter into collective bar-
gaining agreements with respect to those matters are not in-
tended to apply to public employment."46
-IMany cases from other jurisdictions have held there is no right of public
employees to strike. See Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn.
269, 83 A.2d 482 ('95'); Miami Water 'Works Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla.
445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946); Mugford v. Mayor and City Council, 185 Md. 266, 44
A.2d 745 (1945); McAuliffe v. Mayor, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892); City of
Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, ioo N.H. 507, 131 A.2d 59 (1957);
Society of N.Y. Hosp. v. Hanson, 185 Misc. 937, 59 N.Y.S.2d 91 (Sup. Ct. 1945);
City of Cleveland v. Division 268 of Amalgamated Ass'n, 3o Ohio Op. 395, go N.E.2d
711 (C.P. 1949); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Grand River Dam Authority
292 P.2d ioi8 (Okla. 1956); City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance,
141 A.2d 624 (R.I. 1958); Alcoa v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 203 Tenn.
12, 308 S.W.2d 746 ('957); Weakley County Municipal Elec. Sys. v. Vick, 309 S.V.2d
792 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957); CIO v. City of Dallas, 1!8 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App.
1946); Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union,
52 Wash. 2d 317, 324 P.2d 1o99 (1958).
'74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P.2d 741 (1946).
'See note 7 supra.
"See note 40 supra at 747.
1378 Cal. App. 2d 638, 178 P.2d 537 (1947).
"Id. at 545. "The controlling principle.., is that employment in the public
service frequently entails a necessary surrender of certain civil rights to a limited
extent ...because of the dominant public interest in the unimpeded and unin-
terrupted performance of the functions of government. Fair treatment for public
employees does not require legal protection for concerted labor action generally,
for such treatment is, in the public field, compelled to a considerable extent by
law." City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 94 Cal.
App. 2d 36, 201 P.2d 305, 313 (1949)-
"37 Cal. 2d 412, 232 P.2d 857 ('951).
'OId. at 861. "In this state as elsewhere, a strike against a public entity is un-
lawful." Newmarker v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 16o Cal. App. 2d 640, 325
P.2d 558, 562 (1958).
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"[T]here is no mention of the grant of a right to strike against the
governmental employer after the employees become public em-
ployees."
47
The expressed policy of the state of California in creating the
Transit Authority was to develop a mass rapid transit system for the
benefit of the people, however the holding in the present case could
cause the shutting down of the whole transit system to the public
detriment because of a strike.48 The New York case of Railway Mail
Ass'n v. Murphy49 expressed this idea by holding that to allow gov-
ernmental workers to dictate to the government the conditions under
which they will carry out the vital services necessary to the welfare,
security and safety of the public is to transfer all governmental power
to them.50
The result in the principal case is also made questionable because
of the court's lack of differentiation in classes of employees able to
strike. By implication all Transit Authority employees are given the
right to strike whether they are clerical workers, police, guards, main-
tenance workers or oierators. Thd police of the Transit Authority
who have the duty of protecting the public property may go out on
strike and leave the vast properties unprotected. 51 The operation of
the Transit Authority is a vital service necessary for the public wel-
fare, so that to allow all employees to strike, regardless of their job
classification, is to go against public policy.52
The California Legislature was careful to provide in the act for an
arbitration board to settle "disputes over wages, salaries, hours or
working conditions, which is not resolved by negotiations in good faith
4355 P.2d at 9i9.".ibid.
49i8o Misc. 868, 44 N.Y.S.2d 6oi (Sup. Ct. 1943).
O'Id. at 607. "To admit as true that Government employees have power to
halt or check the function of government; unless their demands are satisfied, is to
transfer to them all legislative, executive and judicial power. Nothing would be
more ridiculous .... The formidable and familiar weapon in industrial strife and
warfare-the strike-is without justification when used against the Government.
When so used, it is rebellion against constituted authority."
51See note 47 supra at 922.
"New York City Transit Authority v. Loos, 2 Misc. 2d 733, 154 N.Y.S.2d 209, 215
(Sup. Ct. 1956). "[T]he operation of the rapid transit facilities is a basic govern-
mental service indispensable to the conduct of all other governmental as well as
private activities necessary for the public welfare." See also statement by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt in a letter to Luther C. Steward, President of National
Federation of Federal Employees, dated August 16, 3937; City of Springfield v.
Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539, 542 (1944).
